




Differentiated integration obtains when the European Union (EU) makes treaties and laws whose formal 
legal validity does not extend to all member states equally. It offers a way out of deadlocked negotiating 
situations in EU treaty-making and legislation if the heterogeneity of member state preferences and 
capacities is too large to achieve unanimity or a qualified majority for uniform rules or if domestic non-
ratification prevents member states from participating in common policies. 
Enlargement has always been a major driver of differentiation in European integration (Duttle et al. 
forthcoming; Schimmelfennig & Winzen 2014). First, accession negotiations are mainly about temporary 
differentiation. Because new member states are required to adopt the entire acquis communautaire, 
and the old member states are required to transfer the entire acquis to new members, all they can 
negotiate on is a temporary or conditional delay of integration for individual rules. Each accession treaty 
therefore contains transitional arrangements with derogations from the full and immediate validity of EU 
rules for the new member states. Such derogations may exempt new member states temporarily from 
legal obligations to give them more time to adapt. Yet they sometimes also discriminate against the new 
members by excluding them temporarily from certain rights and benefits of membership. In Eastern 
enlargement, restrictions on the free movement of labour, initial exclusion from the Eurozone and the 
Schengen area, and the phasing-in of agricultural subsidies are cases in point.  
Second, the accession of new member states has also regularly produced peaks in legislative 
differentiation after enlargement. To some extent, this is a result of accession treaties affecting the EU’s 
secondary law in addition to treaty law. In addition, however, new member states have often been 
granted further exemptions or they have used their newly acquired formal decision-making power to 
obtain them. New member states start their EU membership with a comparatively high level of 
differentiation, or acquire such a high level in the first years of membership, before they converge with 
the level of differentiation of the old member states (Duttle et al. forthcoming). Finally, enlargement has 
generally increased the heterogeneity of EU membership. New member states may have integration and 
policy preferences and capacities that fall outside the core of the old member states. Enlargement 
therefore increases the likelihood that European integration will become more differentiated over time. 
This indirect effect of enlargement should be observable in post-accession secondary legislation and 
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treaty revisions. The Polish 2007 opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights is such a post-
accession differentiation resulting from the Kaczynski government’s extremely conservative integration 
and policy preferences.  
In this paper, we analyse the ‘normalization’ of the new member states’ differentiated integration as an 
indicator of the EU’s internal integration capacity. We understand normalization in two ways. For one, 
we examine quantitative normalization: the more the new member states approximate the level of 
comparable old member states, the more effectively they are integrated into the EU. In addition, we take 
normalization to mean that the new member states are differentiated for the same reasons and in the 
same areas as the old member states. The dominant correlates of differentiated integration are wealth 
and national identity – does that also hold for the new member states? 
This paper will report and analyse data on the differentiated integration of the EU member states that 
joined in 2004 and 2007. We ask whether the new member states’ initial differentiated integration has 
decreased – and to what extent they have obtained new differentiations during the first years of their 
membership. In order to approximate the counterfactual scenario of differentiated integration in the 
absence of recent enlargement, we compare the Eastern new member states to the Southern old 
member states, to which they are structurally most similar. In each case, we distinguish between 
‘exemptive differentiation’ – favouring the new member states by postponing legal obligations of 
membership – and ‘discriminatory differentiation’ excluding the new member states from desired rights 
and benefits of EU membership and legislation (Schimmelfennig 2014). In addition, we explore variation 
among the Eastern new member states and across EU policies.  
We argue that the post-accession differentiated integration of the new member states is, indeed, a story 
of normalization. Both with regard to the extent and the causes of differentiation, the new member 
states have increasingly converged both with the old member states and with established patterns of 
differentiation. We even see that, in comparison with the Southern member states, Eastern member 
states have had ‘too low’ levels of differentiation. Finally, even though new member states were 
generally treated highly equally by the EU in terms of differentiations, we find that both poorer new 
member states and member state with a stronger national identity have been slightly more 
differentiated in some policy areas. This is again in line with established patterns of differentiation in the 
EU.  In sum, during roughly the first decade after enlargement, the new member states have become 
‘normal’ member states with regard to differentiated integration. By the same token, our analysis shows 
that the initial differentiation has resulted from a temporary enlargement effect and that EU legal 
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integration capacity has proven robust. Some uncertainty remains as to the persistence and future 
development of selected cases of differentiation such as the Eurozone opt-outs of several new member 
states.  
Explaining	the	differentiated	integration	of	new	member	states	
According to the basic story in the literature (see, e.g., Dyson & Sepos 2010: : 5-6; Jensen & Slapin 2012; 
Kölliker 2006; Leuffen et al. 2013; Majone 2009: : 221), differentiated integration is best understood as 
an institutional response to the increasing heterogeneity of member state preferences (willingness) and 
capacities (ability) resulting from both the widening and the deepening of the EU. Willingness consists in 
having an interest in participating in the internal market and the common policies of the EU, and in being 
prepared to transfer state competences to the supranational level. Ability results from the political 
system as well as economic and governance capacity. The EU requires members to be democracies, rule-
of-law systems, and market economies, to be able to withstand the pressures of the internal market, and 
to implement supranational rules effectively.1  
Enlargement is prone to increase the heterogeneity of the EU’s membership. Some new member states 
were initially ‘unwilling’ because they were sceptical of giving up state autonomy – and sufficiently 
wealthy and economically successful to be able to afford refraining from integration (Mattli 1999). This 
applied, for instance, to Britain, the Nordic countries, and Switzerland initially (Gstöhl 2002). Others were 
willing but lacked capacity. This was initially the case for Southern European countries and has also 
generally been true for the Central and Eastern European accession candidates: relatively poor transition 
countries with uncertain governance capacity. In both cases, the increased heterogeneity generates 
bargaining about the terms of accession during the enlargement process. As a result, accession treaties 
regularly contain ‘transitional arrangements’, which either grant the new member states temporary 
exemptions from legal obligations of EU membership or deprive them temporarily from certain rights 
and benefits. In the following sections, we present theoretical arguments and empirical findings on the 
factors influencing the amount, kind, and duration of such transitional arrangements. They help us to 




The baseline: temporary differentiation and equal treatment in enlargement rounds 
As a baseline, we start from two general patterns of differentiated integration among new member 
states. First, differentiations based on accession are more short-lived than differentiations based on 
treaty revisions. In contrast to treaty-based differentiations negotiated among existing member states, 
they are not only generally defined as temporary and transitional but also expire faster on average 
(Schimmelfennig & Winzen 2014). Second, new member states joining in the same enlargement round 
enjoy fairly equal treatment. To some extent, this can be explained by the fact that enlargement rounds 
consist of countries with similar historical legacies, political and economic conditions. Still, ‘enlargement 
round’ outperforms all other country characteristics in explaining the amount of differentiated 
integration of new member states (Schimmelfennig 2014). 
These baseline patterns can be explained by the legal construction of the EU (Schimmelfennig 2014). 
First, legal systems are normatively and institutionally biased against differentiation. Differentiation may 
be acceptable to facilitate the integration of new member states for a limited period of time but 
undesirable for the long term or even permanently. Second, EU negotiators are constrained to treat 
candidates equally because European treaty law is based on the principle of state equality. As a 
consequence, exemptions granted to one country are also granted to other candidates if they so demand 
– at least within the same enlargement round. It also means that individual candidates are not singled 
out for discrimination but that temporary exclusions are applied to all countries of an enlargement 
round. Additionally, equal treatment is likely to facilitate and speed up enlargement negotiations 
because all candidate countries understand that EU negotiators are unwilling to allow tailor-made 
transition arrangements and that candidates will not reap private gains from separate negotiations. 
Temporary differentiation and equal treatment set the stage in favour of a quick approximation of 
differentiation integration between new and old member states, and against strong differences in 
differentiated integration among the new member states. On this basis, we can now turn to factors 
potentially explaining variation in the duration of transitional arrangements and in the amount and kind 
of differentiated integration across the new member states. 
 
Sources of variation: wealth and identity 
Variation in differentiated integration among the new members can be attributed to their preferences 
and capacities – and to their bargaining power vis-à-vis the old member states. Studies of differentiated 
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integration show that wealth and identity are major correlates of differentiated integration among EU 
member states (Schimmelfennig & Winzen 2014; Winzen 2016; Winzen & Schimmelfennig forthcoming). 
First, poorer member states and member states with a more exclusive national identity have more 
differentiated integration. Second, wealth has a particularly strong effect on the initial differentiation of 
new member states, whereas national identity matters more for treaty revisions and legislation among 
the existing member states. Third, differentiated integration now mainly affects policies related to core 
state powers (such as monetary policy, Schengen/Dublin, and justice and home affairs). Similar patterns 
among the new member states of the Eastern enlargement would corroborate the normalization 
argument. 
In a bargaining perspective, Christina Schneider (Plümper & Schneider 2007; Schneider 2009) analyses 
transitional arrangements as instruments to overcome intergovernmental deadlock in accession 
negotiations deriving from conflict about the distribution of gains and losses from enlargement. Old 
member states, or powerful interest groups in these states, fear economic and financial losses or a 
reduction in governance efficiency as a result of market integration with the new member states (e.g. 
resulting from the opening up of labour markets), the redistribution of EU funds (e.g. in agriculture or 
regional policy), or weak implementation capacity (e.g. by expanding the Schengen regime before 
effective border controls are in place). Likewise, new member states fear popular opposition against 
membership if, for instance, citizens from the old member states are allowed to buy homes and land 
without restrictions. Differentiated integration is an instrument to placate the relative losers – ideally 
until preferences, economies and administrative capacities have converged sufficiently to minimize their 
losses. 
Relatively poor candidates produce the strongest concerns about ‘integration capacity’ and 
redistribution and thus create demand among the old member states for differentiation in the form of 
discriminatory exclusion. In addition, the old member states also possess the bargaining power to 
impose such discriminatory exclusion on poorer candidates. As a result of asymmetrical 
interdependence, prospective new member states are normally in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis 
the EU. Their markets are much smaller than the internal market, and bilateral trade with the EU is much 
more important to them than it is to the EU. As a consequence, candidate countries have more to gain 
from EU membership than the EU has to gain from accession of the candidate country, and candidate 
countries in the vicinity of the EU usually do not have credible outside options at all. This is especially 
true for the Central and Eastern European countries (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2005). Under these 
circumstances, the old member states are generally able to decide on the terms of the transitional 
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arrangements with new member states. Whereas wealthier countries are more able to afford remaining 
outside the EU, poorer and badly governed countries have an overwhelming interest in market access, 
transfers from EU funds, and EU regulatory and administrative capacity – and therefore accept 
discrimination more readily. By the same token, poorer new member states lack the bargaining power to 
realize exemptions upon accession. We therefore hypothesize: 
(H1a) The poorer a new member state is, the more likely it is subject to differentiated integration. 
(H1b) The poorer a new member state is, the more likely it is subject to discriminatory differentiation and 
the less it benefits from exemptive differentiation. 
 
Candidates may have non-material motivations to seek opt-outs, too. Some member states and societies 
have principled objections to transferring powers to the EU for fear of hollowing out national sovereignty 
(Schimmelfennig & Winzen 2014; Winzen & Schimmelfennig forthcoming). Sovereignty concerns are 
prone to arise most strongly in member states with strong national identities.  Earlier research has 
shown that exclusive national identities reduce support for European integration (Carey 2002; Hooghe & 
Marks 2005). Hooghe and Marks further argue that exclusive national identities are likely to be activated 
if the scope and depth of integration increase perceptibly (Hooghe & Marks 2008: : 13). It is therefore 
plausible to assume that countries with stronger national identities are more likely to demand 
exemptions and oppose discrimination because of their sovereignty-oriented preferences. They may also 
be more capable of realizing their preferences as governments can point to sceptical public opinion to 
achieve a better deal in accession negotiations. 
Even though earlier research has shown that national identities do not matter systematically in the 
accession context, we think there are good reasons to explore their effects here. On the one hand, these 
2004 and 2007 enlargements occurred in a more deeply integrated and more politicized EU than earlier 
enlargements. We may therefore find an empirical relationship that was not apparent before. On the 
other hand, our analysis includes the post-accession period, new legislation, and the revision of treaties.  
(H2a) The stronger the national identity of a new member state is, the more likely it is subject to 
differentiated integration. 
(H2b) The stronger the national identity of a new member state is, the less likely it is subject to 
discriminatory differentiation and the more it benefits from exemptive differentiation. 
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The likelihood that identity and sovereignty concerns arise varies across policies. Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs (2014: :10) define ‘core state powers’ (such as a state’s army, police and justice system, 
currency, or public administration) as those functions and policies that have particularly strong 
‘institutional significance for state building’ and are thus closely linked to sovereignty. The integration of 
such policies is more likely to trigger identity politics, leading to politicization and differentiation 
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2015; Winzen & Schimmelfennig forthcoming). It is also likely to increase old 
member state concerns about the governance capacity of new member states. Because identity and 
sovereignty concerns are normally more principled than concerns about economic and technical policies, 
we further assume that new member state differentiations in the area of core state powers are more 
durable and will increase as they participate in treaty revisions and new legislation. 
(H3) Policies in the area of core state powers are more likely to be and remain differentiated.  
Finally, candidates are in a particularly vulnerable and dependent position when they negotiate 
accession. In this time period, old member state bargaining power is at its peak. Once they are members, 
however, they are protected by the principles of non-discrimination and legal equality, participate in the 
elaboration of new rules and possess voting power. The consensus orientation of the Council of 
Ministers further strengthens any member state’s ability to avoid detrimental legislative outcomes (e.g. 
Heisenberg 2005; Smeets 2015). We assume that it is particularly difficult to impose discriminatory rules 
on new member states once they have joined the EU.  
(H4a) New member states are less subject to discriminatory differentiation after accession. 
(H4b) By contrast, new member states are more likely to attain exemptions after accession. 
In line with the normalization argument, we expect that the differentiated integration of the new 
member states will align itself with that of the old member states. In particular, their level of 
differentiation, and the mix of exemptions and discrimination, should approximate that of similar old 
member states. Moreover, the normalization argument implies that differentiation among the new 
member states varies with their wealth and national identities. 
Data	and	research	design	
Our investigation relies on the EUDIFF1 (primary law) and EUDIFF2 (secondary law) datasets on 
differentiated EU integration and legislation (Duttle et al. forthcoming; Schimmelfennig & Winzen 2014). 
The EUDIFF1 dataset tells us, year-by-year, whether a country is bound by any given article in the EU’s 
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main treaties. It also records any treaty-law differentiation that enlargement treaties create. Our analysis 
aggregates this data into ‘differentiations’. Opt-outs from individual treaty articles that enter into force 
and end at the same time and apply to the same policy area constitute a differentiation. Thus, for 
instance, a country’s opt out from the Schengen area, which is regulated in over 150 treaty articles, is 
coded as one differentiation. The EUDIFF2 datasets tells us, again on a yearly basis, whether any given 
secondary legal act that is currently in force fully binds a given country. It shows, for instance, whether 
any particular directive that existed in, for instance, 2005 contained a differentiation for, for instance, 
Poland or Latvia. If a country is not bound by at least some parts of a legal act, we say that it has a 
differentiation. 
Based on these raw data, we have manually identified whether each primary and secondary law 
differentiation is an exemption or discrimination. A differentiation that withholds or limits membership 
or legislative rights and benefits from a new member state is discriminatory, such as Bulgaria’s and 
Romania’s exclusion from the Schengen area, or transition periods regarding the free movement of 
workers from new member states. A differentiation that limits membership or legislative obligations and 
burdens on a new member state is an exemption, such as transition periods in competition law granted 
to new countries in order to make state aid for their heavy industries possible. 
In order to investigate variation across policy areas, we begin with the disaggregated areas identified in 
the EUDIFF1 and 2 datasets. These areas are derived from the titles of the treaty sections in which 
individual treaty articles are, or in which the legal bases of legislation are. Since these areas are 
numerous, we aggregate them into four large policy domains: the market, encompassing the four 
freedoms and adjacent areas such as competition; agriculture; regulatory policies such as health, 
consumer protection or environment; and core state powers, including monetary union, foreign affairs, 
justice and internal security policies (for further details, see Duttle et al. forthcoming). 
The analysis of primary law examines discriminations and exemptions in the 2004 and 2007 accession 
treaties, and traces their development in the subsequent years. This analysis does not make an explicit 
comparison to establish whether the level of discrimination or exemption of the newcomers is 
excessively high or low. First, only new members can obtain differentiations from accession treaties, 
while other countries do not even have that opportunity.2 Second, a comparison through time is not 
convincing. The previous enlargement dates back nine years and, with Austria, Finland and Sweden, 
integrated entirely different (wealthier, better-governed, and democratically consolidated) countries. 
The Southern enlargement happened in the 1980s, still at the time of the European Communities, before 
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the Single Market Programme and the EU’s acquisition of competences in core state powers. Thus, we 
limit ourselves to saying how much and what kind of differentiation resulted directly from the accession 
treaty. 
The analysis of secondary legislation investigates the level of discrimination and exemptions of new 
member states in every year since their accession in 2004/2007. Let us, however, underline the 
importance of an appropriate benchmark for comparison: What level of differentiation should we have 
expected from a given new member states, had that state not recently joined the Union? Expecting no 
differentiation at all could be inappropriate given that old member states might be subjected to a certain 
number of exemptions and discriminations in legislative politics. Of course, even if comparable old 
member states experience similar patterns of differentiation, we could still say that newcomers are 
being discriminated or exempted – however, it would be inappropriate to conclude that they are treated 
in this way because they are new member states.  
In order to establish an appropriate benchmark, our strategy is to compare the new member states to 
the most comparable old member states: the Southern countries, Greece, Portugal and Spain. As the 
Central East European countries, the Southern group is poor economically and suffers from weak 
governance capacity, compared to the Union’s North Western members. It also relies comparatively a lot 
on agriculture. It is obvious that this empirically-oriented strategy does not ideally approximate a 
counterfactual comparison. First, however, we suggest that an empirical benchmark, even if imperfect, is 
preferable over a thought experiment that, in this context, must be seen as highly speculative. Second, 
the comparison to the South is more appropriate than, say, to a rich Northern European member state. 
Third, while the Southern countries differ from the Central and East European newcomers, they do so in 
ways that we can clarify and potentially exploit analytically: On average, the 2004/2007 cohort is poorer, 
has more nationally-oriented populations, significantly more heavy industry, and, in some cases, slightly 
larger agricultural sectors (see Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found., 
Error! Reference source not found., Error! Reference source not found.). Given these differences, one 
would generally expect that the Eastern enlargement countries obtain more differentiations than the 
South (see H1a and H2a). In the case of such an outcome, it would be difficult to establish whether their 
newcomer status or their domestic conditions account for the discrepancy to the South. An outcome in 
which the East faces fewer differentiations would, however, be more clearly attributable to their recent 




Beginning the empirical analysis at the treaty-level, Error! Reference source not found. shows the 
development of the treaty-based differentiation of the new member states since 2004. The figure 
excludes Cyprus and Malta because these two countries are not easily comparable to the others, due to 
their size, island status, difficult security situations (Cyprus), relatively affluent economies, and relatively 
Europhile populations. But including the two countries would have confirmed the main trends (not 
shown here).3 The left-hand panel shows that the 2004 newcomers had six differentiations each, except 
for Slovenia, which had five. The two additional differentiations of Bulgaria and Romania relate to the 
Prüm Convention that had not yet been signed at the time of the 2004 enlargement. Otherwise the 2007 
newcomers’ opt-outs are the same as for the 2004 group. In the appendix, we provide disaggregated 
information by country, discriminations and exemptions (Error! Reference source not found.). The six 
differentiations all countries share encompass four cases of discrimination and two exemptions: 
• Exclusion from the common currency; 
• Exclusion from the Schengen area; 
• Restrictions regarding the free movement of workers; 
• Restrictions regarding the freedom to provide services; 
• Exemptions from competition law, in particular regarding state aid; 
• Exemptions from capital mobility, in particular regarding the acquisition of land and property by 
foreign buyers. 
The left-hand panel of Error! Reference source not found. further shows that the treaty-based 
differentiations of the 2004 cohort have gradually expired. The new member states have acceded to the 
Schengen area and, in some cases, the common currency. Free movement discriminations and 
exemptions have largely expired. In 2013, only some capital mobility exemptions and Eurozone 
discriminations remain. Note, moreover, that it is unclear whether the latter can still be understood as 
discriminatory. Whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have initially been excluded from 
monetary union, they have become highly reluctant to work towards Eurozone membership in the 
meantime. Bulgaria and Romania lag behind. Even though they have joined the Prüm Convention, 
discriminatory differentiation remained in 2013 regarding the Eurozone and Schengen, the free 
movement of workers and services, while exemptions in competition policy have expired. Preferential 
treatment regarding capital mobility still applied in Bulgaria in 2013. Finally, there is some variation in 
the speed in which differentiation has expired. Overall, however, except for Bulgaria and Romania, there 
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clearly is a common cross-country trend towards uniform integration that had almost come to an end in 
2013, eight years after the 2004 enlargement (for patterns disaggregated by country, see Error! 
Reference source not found.). 
 
< Figure 1 here> 
 
One might ask whether new differentiations have compensated for the dissipation of accession treaty-
based differentiation. In the right panel, we examine the level of new members’ differentiation, taking 
into account opt-outs arising from treaties that entered into force after accession, the Prüm Convention 
(for the 2004 cohort), the Lisbon Treaty, the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM) Treaty, and the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). Because doing so means that the opportunities 
for countries to acquire differentiations vary over time, we divide the absolute numbers of opt-outs by 
the number of policy areas under EU jurisdiction in a given year. If we treat each policy area as a 
differentiation opportunity, the figure shows the share of differentiation opportunities that 2004/2007 
accession countries made use of in a given year. Treating policy areas as opportunities slightly 
underestimates the decline of differentiation over time because a country’s number of differentiations in 
a policy area can grow over time – for instance, if they do not participate in the Eurozone from the start, 
and then also stay out of additional changes in Eurozone rules introduced in the Lisbon Treaty. The right-
hand panel nonetheless largely confirms the downward trend. There is a hike in 2006 because not all 
2004 newcomers immediately acceded to the Prüm Convention. Further, the decline of differentiation 
slows in 2010 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, due to follow-up Eurozone differentiations 
and a Polish opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, differentiation has slightly 
increased recently as only Eurozone members adopted the ESM treaty and not all Central and East 
European states had signed the TSCG treaty by 2013. Many have done so since, however, and Latvia and 
Lithuania have acceded to the Eurozone so that the downward differentiation trend continues. 
Considering variation across policy areas, the discussion highlights several points (not shown in figures). 
First, treaty-based differentiation exists in the market and in core state powers but not in the EU’s 
regulatory and agricultural policies. Transition periods regarding agricultural subsidies are regulated in 
the appendices of the enlargement treaty but implemented through opt-outs from secondary legislation. 
The EU’s substantive regulatory policies rely on legislation, while the treaties only contain legal bases. 
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Second, exemptions exist only in the market but not in core state powers, except for Bulgaria and 
Romania initially not joining the Prüm Convention. Discrimination exists in both domains but, in the 
market, it has disappeared entirely for the 2004 cohort, while not all countries have joined the Eurozone 
yet. In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, discrimination persists in the market and in core state powers. 
H3 expected differentiation to be more likely and long-lasting in core state powers than in other 
domains. That discrimination has disappeared almost entirely in the market but not in core state powers 
supports this view. However, developments in the market question H3. There, some capital mobility and 
free movement differentiations persist. Moreover, we do not see more differentiation in core state 
powers overall. 
Error! Reference source not found. explores whether new member states’ exemptions from the market, 
and discriminations in core state powers, correlate with per capita national wealth and prevailing 
exclusive identity conceptions in the population. As noted, variation between countries is mainly the 
result of the different duration of differentiation since accession so that the outcome of interest in the 
figures effectively is the speed with which countries move towards uniform integration. The figures 
confirm that there is very limited variation overall and that candidates of the same enlargement round 
are treated fairly equally. There is a slight tendency, in line with H1b, for poor countries to benefit from 
longer-lasting market exemptions and to suffer from longer-lasting discrimination in core state powers. 
However, these tendencies are strongly driven by the Eastern front-runner towards uniformity, Slovenia, 
and the two laggards, Bulgaria and Romania. We do not consider market discrimination and core state 
power exemptions because there is nearly no cross-country variation at all in both cases. 
In conclusion, while there is some variation across policy areas and countries, the basic story at the 
treaty level is one of equal treatment and temporary differentiation, in line with our baseline 
expectation. Bulgaria and Romania still defy this tendency to some extent although these two countries 
have also followed a downward differentiation trajectory so far. The two policy domains in which 
differentiation may prove lasting are capital mobility and Eurozone membership. In the case of Eurozone 
membership, a core state power that has long been highly differentiated in the EU, this is 
understandable. The persistence of selected capital mobility exemptions, however, is not common in 





Error! Reference source not found. shows the average overall level of differentiation of the 2004 and 
2007 accession countries, in comparison to the other cohorts. For the older cohorts, the figure shows the 
last years of a long-term decline in differentiation that results in particular from the consolidation of the 
EU’s market legislation. However, widespread exemptions from core state powers, notably justice and 
home affairs legislation, distinguish the Northern cohort (Duttle et al. forthcoming; Winzen 2016). The 
level of differentiation of the 2004 cohort increases slightly. Bulgaria and Romania have fewer 
differentiations but follow a similar trajectory. By 2012, the Central East European countries converge 
with the Southern cohort that, we argued, constitutes the most appropriate standard of comparison. 
Statistically, the 2004 cohort is no longer significantly different from the South by 2009 – the same holds 
for Bulgaria and Romania as of 2012. However, also note that the new member states did not have as 
many differentiations as the South at the time of their accession. We explore and disaggregate these 
patterns in this section. 
 
< Figure 2 > 
 
Error! Reference source not found. shows discriminations and exemptions of the 2004 and 2007 
accession countries, and the Southern member states. Comparing the Eastern to the Southern countries, 
the former suffer from more discrimination throughout our period of analysis. The overall level of 
discrimination is very low, however, and the difference results from the East’s agricultural transition 
periods as well as some countries’ non-participation in Eurozone related legislation. In line with H4, 
discrimination in post-accession secondary legislation has been much less pronounced than 
discrimination in the accession treaties. Moreover, exemptions have been more frequent in the post-
accession period than discriminations. 
 




Additionally, the new member states do not benefit from as many exemptions as the Southern countries. 
However, while they maintain a roughly stable number of exemptions until the end of 2012, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain’s opt-outs shrink gradually. Unlike the new members, the Southern countries follow 
an EU-wide trend towards uniformity that can be shown to exist in market and agricultural legislation 
(Duttle et al. forthcoming). By 2012, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania had reached similar levels of 
exemption as the Southern countries. Bulgaria’s and Romania’s discriminations and exemptions 
generally resemble those of the least well-positioned countries of the 2004 group. The two panels in the 
lower half of Error! Reference source not found. further show that the reason for the converging 
exemption trends of the South and East is the decline of Southern exemptions. The Eastern countries 
obtain more exemptions (and discriminations) in their initial membership year, but afterwards the 
differences are very small. It is clearly not the case that the new member states successfully negotiate 
exemptions (or unsuccessfully oppose discrimination) at a notably higher rate than the Southern 
countries. This is an indication of normalization. Yet, the exemptions that they obtain from legislation 
persist during our period of analysis, whereas the Southern states (and the EU more generally) are 
moving on a trajectory towards uniformity. It remains to be seen whether the new member states will 
join this trajectory as soon as the rest has ‘caught up’ with their low exemption levels. 
 
< Figure 4 > 
 
Interpreting these observations, keep in mind that, in a bargaining perspective, the difference in 
secondary law differentiation between the South and East could plausibly result from the latter 
countries’ somewhat weaker, more agricultural, and industrial economies. That the poorer Eastern 
cohort was more discriminated and benefited less from exemptions during the period of observation is 
in line with Hypothesis 1b. Even though direct discrimination is weak after accession (legislative 
discriminations are very rare in any case), the 2004 and 2007 cohorts clearly suffer from excessively low 
levels of exemptions for most of the period that we investigate – i.e. from what one could label ‘indirect 
discrimination’. Only in 2013 could some new members be said to have overcome indirect 
discrimination. 
Error! Reference source not found. disaggregates exemptions, the more frequent type of legislative 
differentiation, into policy domains. The patterns in the market domain correspond to what has been 
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described so far. This matters because the market is also an area in which the accession treaties have 
offered newcomers exemptions regarding capital mobility and competition policy. The lack of legislative 
exemptions might be the mirror image of these treaty-based opt-outs. In agricultural policies, the trends 
are also similar to the aggregate picture but the levels of exemption differ. The Southern states never 
had clearly more exemptions than the new members, and their levels fall below that of the 2004 cohort 
in late 2000s. In regulatory policies, finally, the Southern decline is more moderate but the Eastern 
countries in fact accumulate exemptions towards the end of the 2000s. In sum, the indirect 
discrimination observed at the aggregate levels exists in the market and regulatory but not in agricultural 
policies. The EU’s regulatory policies are the only ones in which the new member states gain exemptions, 
instead of ‘waiting’ for the rest of the Union to decline to their levels. The panels also show that the 
absolute number of exemptions is very low in all policy areas. 
Finally, we explore whether accession countries’ exemptions or discriminations correlate with their 
wealth and citizens’ identity conceptions. However, we do not find strong patterns (see Error! Reference 
source not found. and Error! Reference source not found.). Error! Reference source not found. presents 
the clearest finding. In the area of core state powers, there is a tendency for less discrimination of 
countries that are rich, and more discrimination of countries that have populations with exclusive 
identity conceptions. As noted, discrimination in this area predominantly reflects treaty-based opt-outs 
from the Eurozone.  Accordingly, the patterns are similar except that the identity effect was weaker on 
the treaty level. That there is such an effect should not be interpreted to mean that old member states 
exclude nationally-oriented newcomers from core state powers. It rather indicates that Eurozone opt-
outs, while initially clearly discriminatory, have become increasingly ambiguous to categorise. Whether, 
for instance, the Czech Republic and Poland would be prevented from joining the Eurozone today, 
whether they prefer not to, or whether both logics reinforce each other, is unclear. 
 
< Figure 5 > 
Conclusion	
In this paper, we have examined the EU’s integration capacity regarding new member states’ 
differentiated integration and explored variation across member states and policies. In general, the EU’s 
integration capacity has been considerable. Treaty-based differentiations for the new member states 
16 
 
have gradually declined over time, even if we take into account treaties concluded after their accession. 
Secondary-law differentiation has been low for the new member states and largely stable since 
accession. Besides a selected number of persistent capital mobility differentiations, the main remaining 
divide is between Euro area and non-Euro area countries among the 2004 and 2007 intake – a divide that 
we find among the older member states as well. Comparing the new member states to the Southern 
member state reference group, we find that legislative discrimination is low in both cases and legislative 
exemptions converge over time. These developments testify to the gradual quantitative normalization of 
the new member states’ initial differentiations and to a high degree of legal uniformity after accession. 
Since the convergence of Southern and new members stems primarily from declining Southern 
differentiation (which in turn reflects a system-wide trend towards uniformity), an open question is 
whether the Eastern newcomers will now also follow this downward trajectory or rather maintain a 
stable share of legislative exemptions. 
In comparison with the Southern member states, we also find that legislative differentiation has been 
low. The Eastern cohort has obtained slightly more discriminatory differentiation and clearly less 
exemptive differentiation than the Southern cohort in the post-accession period. This suggests that the 
Eastern new members have temporarily suffered from both direct and (mostly) indirect discrimination in 
comparison with the South, potentially because they were poorer and therefore possessed weaker 
bargaining power (H1a). As noted, this difference has declined over time. 
In line with our assumption that member states from the same enlargement round are treated similarly, 
we observe little variation in differentiation. However, we find some evidence for hypothesis 1 that 
wealthier countries incur less discrimination in core state powers, and benefit from fewer market 
exemptions. Contrary to expectations, countries with stronger national identities are more rather than 
less discriminated in the area of core state powers. However, this is mainly an effect of differential 
Eurozone membership—it has become hard to distinguish discrimination and exemption in this area as 
non-members often do not work actively towards adopting the common currency. The pattern points to 
normalization too in the sense that old member states with strong national identities are more likely to 
opt-out from the integration of core state powers. 
In sum, notwithstanding selected exceptions and uncertainty regarding the future trajectory of 
differentiation, the overall picture is one of normalization. The new member states have not only been 
converging to ‘normal’ levels of differentiated integration in the years after accession; they have also 
been differentiated for similar reasons than the old member states. In particular, even though country 
Deleted: Generally, there is little variation in differentiated 
integration across the new member states. This is in line with our 
assumption that member states from the same enlargement round 
or related enlargement rounds incur similar discrimination and 
exemptions. The little variation we do observe among the generally 
similar treatment of the new member states points again to a 
relative poverty effect. In line with hypothesis 1, we find some 
evidence that wealthier countries incur less discrimination (in the 
area of core state powers) and benefit from less long-lasting 
exemptions (in the area of the internal market). This corroborates 
the more general observation that differentiated integration in the 
context of accession affects poorer countries disproportionately. 
Hypothesis 2a is not supported because countries with stronger 
national identity are more rather than less discriminated in the area 
of core state powers. It must be said, however, that this is mainly an 
effect of differential Eurozone membership and that it becomes 
increasingly hard to distinguish discriminatory from exemptive 
differentiation in this area, as current non-Euro area new member 
states most often choose not to work actively towards EMU 
membership rather than being kept out. This pattern again matches 
the old member states well: countries with stronger national 
identities are more likely to opt-out from deepening in the area of 
core state powers. In this respect, we can again speak of a 
normalization of new member state differentiated integration.¶
Finally, and again in line with general patterns of differentiated 
integration in the EU, we observe that the area of core state powers 
is particularly prone to differentiation. While the 2004 and 2007 
accession treaties included core state power and market 
differentiation, differentiated integration in core state powers has 
proven to be most durable, even though we also find persistent 
market differentiation in some countries. It is the only area in which 
new member states have initially been subjected to treaty-based 
discrimination without being ‘compensated’ by exemptions in the 
legislative process; and it is here that variation in wealth and identity 
among the new member states has produced the clearest effects.¶
17 
 
differences are clearly limited, the analysis indicates support for the general pattern that poorer 
countries have higher levels of differentiation upon accession and that core state powers are most prone 
to differentiation. Moreover, the divide between euro area and non-euro area countries has become the 
most important divide among both old and new member states. EU integration capacity has thus proven 
to be strong – yet, this does not imply fully uniform integration but rather refers to the tendency that 
Central and Eastern European countries have increasingly shifted from patterns of differentiation typical 
of new member states to patterns of differentiation typical of old member states.  
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1 These are the main (political, economic, and acquis) dimensions of 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for membership. 
2 Some differentiations in accession treaties, such as transition periods in the free movement of workers, could 
potentially be seen as applying to old member states. However, we have coded them as differentiations for the 
new countries – as discrimination in the case of free movement – in line with how decision-makers and populations 
predominantly perceived them. 
3 By exception, in secondary law, these two relatively wealthy and Europhile countries have more exemptions than 
the Eastern countries in regulatory policies, and as many as the most differentiated Eastern countries in agriculture. 
In these two areas, adding them to the analysis generates patterns we do not observe in the East (i.e. more 
exemptive differentiation for richer and Europhile countries).  
